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Costs of a monetary union are typically analysed in the context of the optimum currency
area approach, looking at the likelihood of asymmetric real disturbances, the degree of
real wage flexibility and of labour mobility. But it is also important to consider the lee-
way of monetary and fiscal policy to respond to country-specific real shocks prior to
entering the monetary union. Applying a structural VAR model to Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom indicates
that costs of giving up autonomous monetary policy in a European Monetary Union
(EMU) would generally not be too high. However, in Belgium, Finland, Italy, France
and Spain autonomous monetary policy has shown positive short-run output effects in
the past, in all other countries such effects are negligible or not significant. Some cush-
ioning influence of adverse EMU effects, then, could be expected from autonomous
fiscal policy measures, since results suggest that autonomous fiscal policy had positive
short-run output ratio effects in the past, those effects being pronounced in Sweden,
Finland, United Kingdom and France.
___________________________________
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1 Introduction
In general, there are two different ways of looking at the costs of a monetary union.
Given the low inter-regional labour mobility in the European Union, the question
whether benefits of a common currency do outweigh costs highly depends on the degree
of asymmetry of real shocks (Mundell, 1961). If real shocks are affecting countries that
fail to meet the flexibility requirements, asymmetrically, it would be better for those
countries to have the possibility to resort to the exchange rate instrument to adjust. A
common currency may be preferable however, if the countries are mainly affected by
asymmetric money and financial market shocks. In stage III of monetary union, specula-
tive attacks, time-varying risk premia and currency substitution that may cause macro-
economic imbalances will disappear. A lot of empirical studies deal with the question
whether the EU-15 are an optimum currency area. Some of these studies also include
considerations about the likelihood of the emergence of new asymmetries in the future
monetary union or the decreasing importance of asymmetries compared to the EMS.
1
But whatever the degree of asymmetry of real shocks, the identification of costs of a
monetary union for individual countries first of all involves the question whether a
country can reduce the costs of asymmetric shocks through autonomous monetary policy
outside the monetary union. Given the existence of asymmetries, a monetary union
would be associated with costs (due to surrendering autonomous monetary policy) only
if the respective national monetary authority would be able to adjust to asymmetric real
disturbances outside the union. Anyway, it may be argued that when entering the mone-
tary union, at least the core ERM
2 countries with basically fixed exchange rates will not
lose an important policy instrument. They just give up something they have not been
using for quite some time. For the other EU countries, monetary policy has been – at
least to some extent – used to counteract asymmetric disturbances, but it is by no means
clear whether the output effects of such policies were positive and thus whether the
"costs of monetary union" for them would be high.
Although the issue of asymmetries attracted a lot of attention, so far there are only a few
studies empirically assessing the costs of a monetary union with regard to giving up
sovereign monetary policy. Since those studies use long-run identifying restrictions
within a structural vector autoregression approach, where monetary policy surprises are
identified in imposing no long-run output effects, they do not address the question of
long-term real effects of monetary policy. They examine whether monetary policy was
capable of influencing real output in the short term. Erkel-Rousse and Mélitz (1997) e.g.
ask if economic costs of asymmetries can be reduced by monetary policy outside the
monetary union. They assume that a relative velocity shock of money at home and
abroad feeds directly into exchange rate variations. If a shock to the relative velocity
influences short-run movements in real output and/or net exports, then monetary policy
is assumed to be an effective stabilisation device. It turns out that relative velocity
shocks (measured in terms of a shock to the real exchange rate) have short run real ef-
fects only in the United Kingdom and in Germany. In the case of Spain, France, Italy
1 Among the many studies in this field cf., e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1991, 1992, 1994), Commission of the
European Communities (1990), Eichengreen (1990), De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1991), Frankel and Rose
(1996), von Hagen and Neumann (1994). For an introductory exposition of the problems involved see De Grauwe
(1997), Gros and Thygesen (1992, ch.7) and Melitz (1997), as an overview cf., e.g., Pauer (1996).
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and the Netherlands on the other hand monetary policy does not seem to be capable of
influencing short-run movements in real output.
Canzoneri, Vallés and Viñals (1996) look at bilateral relationships between Germany
and countries of the periphery as well as between the core (Germany, the Netherlands
and Austria) and periphery countries in order to distinguish different kinds of asymmet-
ric shocks. The identification of shocks draws on the Mundell-Fleming model to impose
long-run restrictions. By considering real asymmetric shocks compared to financial
shocks as being harmful for the monetary union, they find that variations in the relative
outputs are primarily due to non-financial supply and demand shocks. Furthermore, it is
shown that for France, Spain and the United Kingdom, nominal exchange rates were not
an important shock absorber in the past. Italy seemed to be a borderline case. They con-
clude that costs of monetary union are exaggerated, since exchange rates have not
played an important role in absorbing shocks in the past. An innovative approach to
study costs of monetary union was introduced by Mélitz and Weber (1996). Within a
structural VAR framework they simulate common monetary policy in France and Ger-
many, where they distinguish between German dominance, French dominance and a
joint monetary policy in both countries. Their main conclusion is that France would gain
from German participation in monetary policy-making, while Germany would lose from
French dominance in monetary policy. In all three studies, doubts arise about the costs
associated with the surrender of autonomous monetary policy. Erkel-Rousse and Mélitz
(1997) find that in some countries exchange rate shocks feed directly into prices, and
Mélitz and Weber (1996) conclude that France would have had higher growth and lower
inflation under German dominance than it actually had experienced before the policy of
the franc fort.
However, costs of a monetary union also depend on how effective fiscal policy is in
counteracting asymmetric real disturbances. If an absorption shock, interpreted as a fis-
cal policy shock, explains a great deal of the forecast errors in output, the retention of
fiscal policy would be important to stabilise output. Erkel-Rousse and Mélitz (1995)
find that the retention of nationally autonomous fiscal policy is important for all coun-
tries under consideration except Germany.
In this paper we add to the empirical literature on costs of monetary union in two re-
spects: The four variable structural VAR-model applied allows to consider not only the
relative output effects of autonomous monetary policy surprises in a specific country
relative to Germany, we also ask whether fiscal policy surprises relative to Germany
were an important stabilisation device in the past. Measuring such innovations as devia-
tions of the domestic from the German fiscal policy variable the observed effects im-
plicitly measure the outcome of deviations from a rather stability-oriented fiscal policy.
Thus one could then draw some conclusions on potential costs incurred by the Pact for
Stability and Growth.
3
3 The pact of stability and growth allows the reference value for the overall net deficit (net borrowing) of 3% of GDP
only to be exceeded in special circumstances. A medium term target of ”close to balance“, which can be interpreted
as a target for the structural deficit, should allow the European Union (EU) member states to respect the 3%-reference
value during economic downturns. The degree of autonomy in fiscal policy is therefore mitigated, especially for
countries whose budgetary components react more strongly to the business cycle. However, in the case of a severe or
exceptional recession, an exceptionality clause is applicable. An economic downturn is considered exceptional if
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We analyse such bilateral relationships for Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands (core
countries) as well as for Sweden, Finland, Italy, United Kingdom, France and Spain
(periphery countries).
4 Thereby countries of high interest like Sweden, Finland, United
Kingdom and Spain, which are usually excluded, are also considered.
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 gives a description of the structural model. In
chapter 3 results are presented and in the last chapter we draw conclusions.
2 The Structural Model
Due to the criticism of large-scale models (Sims, 1980), structural vector autoregres-
sions (SVARs) have become an important tool in analysing the effects of different poli-
cies. Whereas the former depend on the modeler´s belief about whether the variables are
to be considered exogenous or endogenous, the SVAR regards all variables as endoge-
nous. However, also the SVAR-approach, though to a minor extent, is based on as-
sumptions about the structure of the economy: in specifying the variables to be included
and in identifying independent shocks by means of a number of meaningful theoretical
restrictions.
To analyse the estimated model we take advantage of the triangular shock structure of
its long-run solution as expounded in appendix A. This way of identifying an estimated
model is opposed to the short-run techniques of Sims (1980), Bernanke (1986), and oth-
ers, and was first introduced by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Some recent applications
can be found in Canzoneri et al. (1996) and Weber (1997a,b, 1998).
5 The advantage of
imposing long-run identifying restrictions as opposed to contemporaneous restrictions is
that this methodology allows the data to show short-run dynamics based on a long-run
flexible price model. By using the long-run triangular structure we can sort out the sup-
ply shock from three demand-side disturbances by constraining the latter not to have a
long-run effect on output. Shocks are classified as neutral if they have no long run effect
on relative output, and as non-neutral if they do. This is of course controversial, since
some equilibrium growth models allow for demand shocks that have long-run effects on
output. But as is argued by Blanchard and Quah (1989), even if such effects exist, those
long-run effects are small compared to those of supply disturbances.
2.1 The Theoretical Model
Our model follows the traditional IS/LM and aggregate supply/aggregate demand
(AS/AD) framework, but we assume all variables to be measured relatively to the re-
spective ones of Germany.
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4 Periphery countries indicate countries with a relatively flexible exchange rate policy vis-à-vis Germany, so that the
leeway of monetary policy was somewhat higher than for core countries.
5 Some of the authors (e.g. Mélitz and Weber, 1996) use non-triangular long-term restrictions, even mixed with short-
term constraints (e.g. Galí, 1992), which are usually solved by numerical algorithms.
6 Our model is a modified version of the ones presented in Clarida/Galí (1994) and Weber (1997a,b, 1998).SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 4
(3)
d










t y y y = = (rel. goods market equilibrium),
(6) t d i y p m t t t
d
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where y is relative output, i is the nominal interest rate, g is relative government de-
mand, d is relative private demand, p are relative prices, m is relative money, with su-
perindices s and d indicating supply and demand, respectively; g , f , d and l are
positive parameters and t E is the expectations operator for expectations at time t.T h e
economy is hit by four uncorrelated asymmetric (relative) shocks with zero mean and
finite variance, two of them referring to fiscal and monetary policy surprises,
f e and
m e , respectively, and two of them to aggregate supply,
s e , and aggregate private de-
mand,
d e .
As can be seen from (1), the relative aggregate supply is driven only by its own asym-
metric shocks (e.g. technology shifts or structural changes in the labour market). Along
the lines of an IS relationship relative aggregate demand (2) depends on relative private
demand d (a random walk (3) driven by shocks
d e ) and on relative government de-
mand g . Relative aggregate demand is negatively related to the real interest rate
)] ( E [ t 1 t t p p it - - + . The relative government consumption ratio (4) is driven by country-
specific fiscal policy shocks, where spending is reduced to some extent (f ) by positive
supply shocks. The latter element alludes to the fact that part of government spending
(e.g. unemployment benefits) has a short-run negative output elasticity.
Relative real money demand (6) is negatively related to both the nominal interest rate i
and to private demand d, the latter being interpreted as velocity shifts (individuals re-
duce, c.p., their cash holdings if they want to increase spending). For the relative money
supply (7) we assume that central banks target a constant money growth rate equal to the
German one, with an autonomous monetary policy element
m e . Thus, relative money
supply can be captured by a simple stochastic trend as given in (7). The equilibrium
conditions (5) and (8) close the model.
We then solve this system in eight variables and eight equations for its dynamic rational
expectations equilibrium representation. Eliminating i from (2) and (6) and using (5)
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The forward solution of this difference equation for the rational expectations equilib-

















Taking this solution we can also express the equilibrium real money balances as
(11) t t
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To see that the system in output, government expenses, real money and prices has a tri-
angular shock structure, we take differences (indicated by the operator D) of (1), (4),
(11) and (10) and using the laws of motion and equilibrium conditions we arrive at
(12)
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We see that all level variables have unit roots. In the long run, output is only driven by
supply shocks, the fiscal variable by fiscal policy and supply shocks, real balances are
driven by supply, fiscal policy and private demand shocks, and prices by all shocks, in-
cluding monetary policy innovations.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data and Preparatory Testing
VAR models as described in appendix A were analysed for Austria, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and France.
7 The respec-
tive data are quarterly and taken from the BIS database and the OECD Quarterly Na-
tional Accounts. The sample period starts in 1970:1 and runs through 1996:4. Real gov-
ernment consumption was used as the real fiscal variable, G. Real balances, M/P,w e r e
calculated by deflating M3 harmonised with the GDP deflator. Straightforwardly, real
GDP was used as the real output variable, Y, and the consumer price index (CPI) as
prices P.
The data are expressed as log indices of the domestic relative to German index levels,
the index basis being the first quarter of 1980. Due to German unification the raw data
for German money exhibit a level jump in 1990:3 and the data for German real output a
level jump in 1991:1. The earlier Western German data were extended on the basis of
the pan-German growth rates by replacing the jumps in the quarterly growth rates at
7 Calculations were programmed and performed with the software packages RATS, CATS, EZ-X11 and RatsData.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 6
these points by the average growth rates of the respective four quarters following the
unification. To account for the introduction of the EMS, a step dummy which is one
until 79:2 and zero thereafter was included into the estimated system of equations. An
additional step dummy which is zero until 89:3 and one thereafter should account for
German unification.
The data were seasonally adjusted by taking a backwards four quarter moving average.
Since this filter implies seasonal unit roots in the original data, we performed tests de-
scribed by Hylleberg et al. (1990) on log levels, generally suggesting the correctness of
our hypothesis. Augmented Dickey-Fuller
8 (ADF) as well as the Phillips-Perron
9 tests
were then applied to the differenced data. All of the test results were broadly consistent
with output, government demand, real money stock and prices being integrated of order
one, so that differences of these variables used in the estimation are stationary.
10 Johan-
sen test
11 results did in general not suggest cointegrating restrictions or error correction
terms.
12 For all VAR estimations we used 3 lags of the variables, this structure being
supported by weighting the results of various information criteria.
13
3.2 Interpretation
The results of the innovation accounting (impulse responses) are reported in the figures
of appendix B.
14 They display the impulse responses (accumulated from responses of
differenced variables) of relative real output to the four structural asymmetric shocks
(supply, fiscal policy, private demand and monetary policy shock). The impulse re-
sponses describe the short and medium-term effects of the shocks on the selected vari-
able. The variance decompositions which are displayed in Table 1 of appendix B show
the contribution of each structural disturbance to the variance (of k-quarters ahead fore-
cast errors) for each variable, going from one to thirty quarters. Besides looking at im-
pulse reaction functions and variance decompositions, a possibility to study costs of
monetary union is to simulate a hypothetical scenario with identical monetary policy
shocks. A uniform monetary policy will eliminate the shock
m e relating to differences
in monetary policy vis-à-vis Germany.
8 See Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981).
9 See Perron (1988) and Pillips and Perron (1988).
10 The test results suggested some of the relative price series to be borderline cases between I(1) and I(2). As we
found clear I(1) evidence in most cases the relative price level was generally considered to be I(1) in order to provide
a single framework for our analysis. This also accounts for the fact that especially during the EMS period, inflation
rates converged.
11See Johansen (1991).
12 While the two-step Engle/Granger (1987) procedure did not indicate cointegrating relationships between the vari-
ables, in some cases the Johansen (1991) procedure pointed to the existence of cointegrating vectors. However, add-
ing error correction terms to the VAR did not seem to alter the results significantly. Therefore, in order to keep the
framework simple but still applicable to all countries we did not estimate the model in its vector-error correction
form.
13 Three information criteria were used to determine the lag length for the respective VAR estimation: the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973), the Schwarz Information Criterion (SC; Schwarz, 1978; for both cf., e.g.,
















log + S = ￿￿where S is the determinant of the vari-
ance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals, j is the number of parameters in the model and T is the number of
observations.
14 Impulse responses are shown with two standard error bands, which are computed empirically over 300 replications
following the method outlined in Schuberth/Wehinger (1998).SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 7
There are various checks for the accuracy of the imposed model.
15 Impulse responses of
the endogenous variables to the structural shocks should be consistent with the theoreti-
cal model. However, in order to compare the results, the same model has been applied to
each country. Due to different economic structures, the consistency of the empirical re-
sults with the theoretical model cannot be expected for all countries. However, the im-
pulse responses meet the predictions of the theoretical model in almost all cases. Leav-
ing further discussions aside, we then only concentrate on the output effects of fiscal and
monetary policy shocks.
3.3 Core countries
It is commonly agreed that Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands form a de-facto
monetary union with Germany, the fluctuation bands of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the
Deutschmark being small since the eighties. We look at the response of relative output
to an autonomous monetary policy and fiscal policy surprise. While in the Netherlands
the relative output effect of an asymmetric monetary policy shock is insignificant and
only slightly significant in Austria, it is positive in Belgium, though even there this ef-
fect becomes insignificant after four quarters. In all three countries a relative monetary
policy surprise feeds directly into prices. Autonomous fiscal policy has not been very
effective in counteracting asymmetric output disturbances in the Netherlands but Austria
and Belgium show a slightly significant effect of an asymmetric fiscal policy surprise.
These findings are confirmed by the results of the variance decompositions: In Austria
and the Netherlands asymmetric supply shocks, defined as those having a permanent
effect on output, are the most important source of relative output variability at business
cycle frequencies; they account for about two third of short and medium term output
fluctuations. In Belgium, the forecast error variance of relative output due to this kind of
shock is slightly above 50%. The variance decompositions show that the contribution of
autonomous monetary shocks to relative output variability is about 10% in Austria and
the Netherlands and about 20% in Belgium. Autonomous fiscal policy shocks accounted
for about 10% of short-run variability of the output ratio in Austria and in the Nether-
lands and about 20% in Belgium.
3.4 Periphery countries
Sweden and the United Kingdom are the only periphery countries under consideration
showing no significant positive short run impact of a relative monetary policy surprise
on the output ratio. Autonomous monetary policy seems to have been rather effective in
Finland, Italy and Spain and only slightly significant in France.
The path of relative output after a unit shock to real government consumption relative to
Germany is positive in all periphery countries, this effect being rather pronounced in
Finland and not significant in Italy and Spain.
Unlike for the core countries asymmetric real supply shocks are less important in ex-
plaining relative output variability. Nevertheless, in all periphery countries under con-
sideration except Finland and France, asymmetric supply shocks account for more than
50% of relative output variability after 20 quarters. In France, only 47% of the variance
15 As a general technical check we would expect the responses of each set of graphs in the lower left triangle of the
respective figures to taper off after some quarters due to imposed neutrality restricions of specific shocks on certain
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of the forecast error in relative output is explained by this shock in the long run, in Fin-
land 40%.
Especially in Finland, autonomous fiscal policy was an important shock absorber in the
past: Over 40% (after ten quarters) of relative output variation are attributable to a rela-
tive fiscal policy shock, in Sweden and the United Kingdom, about 20% and 30%, re-
spectively, are explained by this kind of shock. In Spain and Italy, about 10% of the
forecast error variance is due to autonomous fiscal policy surprises. With 30%, France
shows a high contribution of autonomous fiscal policy to variations of the output ratio.
While in Sweden and the United Kingdom, less than 10% of relative output variation is
explained by monetary policy innovations, it is between 10% and 20% in the other pe-
riphery countries under consideration.
3.5 EMU - Scenario
Besides looking at impulse reaction functions and variance decompositions, a possibility
to study costs of monetary union is to simulate a hypothetical scenario with identical
monetary policy.
16 A uniform monetary policy will eliminate the shock
m e related to
differences in monetary policy vis-à-vis Germany. Though the deviations of the actual
variables from the respective simulated variables were estimated for all variables and all
shocks, the figures in appendix B only display the simulation results for the output and
price ratios absent the fiscal and monetary policy shocks. In each country, historical epi-
sodes alternate between output losses and gains due to autonomous monetary policy.
Bearing in mind the results of the impulse response functions and variance decomposi-
tions those output gains and losses can be considered significant in Finland, Italy and
Spain and less significant in Belgium and France. A positive deviation of the actual
from the simulated path indicates relative output losses of a monetary union. In the pe-
riod before the mid 80s, deviations from the EMU-scenario seem to correspond with the
countries´ individual reactions to business cycles and/or oil price shocks. Since the mid-
80s however, in Italy, France and Spain, such deviations are on average positive which
points to possible costs when joining the monetary union: The countries would have
been worse off in terms of relative output losses if they had followed a joint monetary
policy with Germany. This result has to be qualified with respect to Italy, where after
1990 relative output deviations become smaller. As expounded below, the positive out-
put ratio effect of the devaluation in 1992 seems to have been of a short term nature and
turned negative in 1994. Interestingly, since the mid-70s, the Italian price level ratio was
lower than the simulated path: Italian inflation would have been even higher under a
scenario of common monetary policy with Germany. This indicates that Italian monetary
policy was relatively restrictive and that inflation pressure in the past primarily stemmed
from the real side of the economy.
In general, since the mid 80s, Italy, France and Spain sucessfully made use of the room
for manoeuvre of monetary policy within the ERM. Surprisingly, even France that fol-
lows the policy of franc fort since 1985/86, had, though to a small extent, some auton-
omy in monetary policy. Relative output was slightly higher as compared to the simu-
lated relative output variable.
17
16 For a description of the simulation method see appendix A, 6.2.
17 On the other hand, the graph indicates that during the period of monetary ease between 1976 and 1983, France
would have been better off in terms of relative output gains if it had followed the German style of monetary policy.
This result supports the findings of Melitz/Weber (1996).SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 9
While in Italy, France and Spain some costs of joining a monetary union can be identi-
fied, the results of the simulation exercise are different for Finland. After the mid-80s,
actual relative output was lower than in the scenario of common monetary policy with
Germany. The devaluation of the Finnish currency between 1991 until 1993, however,
which followed the breakdown of its largest trading partner, the Soviet Union, seemed
to have contributed – after some time lag – to a recovery of the Finnish economy. The
recovery was supported by a restrictive monetary policy, which led to a price level ratio
lower than achieved with a German style monetary policy.
The hypothetical scenario with identical monetary policy also allows to get some insight
into the recent experiences of Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom following the crises
of September 1992 in the EMS that are sometimes cited as successful devaluations as
compared to France that maintained its franc fort policy.
18 However, our simulations
indicate that the relative output effects are high only in the case of Spain and low for the
United Kingdom and Italy. Furthermore, they seem to be only of a short term nature.
Though monetary union per se does not imply uniform fiscal policy, the Pact for Stabil-
ity and Growth will constrain the countries to follow a more uniform fiscal policy. So
the next type of simulations is one absent autonomous government demand shocks.
Again, we only consider countries such as Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom
that showed significant output ratio effects of autonomous fiscal policy surprises. Of
special interest are the 90s where all three countries as opposed to Germany considera-
bly increased their structural deficits, whereby their fiscal position became unsustainable
until the second half of the 90s, when consolidation measures were implemented sucess-
fully. In Sweden and Finland, relative output was higher than with uniform fiscal policy
in the beginning of the 90s. In the course of the consolidation measures around the mid-
90s, those output gains turned negative. The results for the United Kingdom are less
clear-cut. In all cases the output ratio effects of autonomous fiscal policy surprises are
much higher than those of autonomous monetary policy surprises. For Finland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom, fiscal policy measures seem to be capable of counteracting
asymmetric disturbances.
Including the results of the impulse response functions, the variance decompositions and
the simulation exercise, several conclusions can be drawn with respect to EMU: We
observe that fluctuations in relative GDP were mainly driven by supply shocks. How-
ever, autonomous fiscal policy has some initial positive output ratio effects in all coun-
tries. These effects are prominent in Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom and have
low or no significance in Austria, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. For the former
countries, the Pact for Stability and Growth could consequently have undesirable effects
on their ability to dampen variability in relative output and to counteract asymmetric
disturbances.
Less important than relative fiscal policy surprises are autonomous monetary policy in-
novations with respect to their effect on the output ratio. Relative output effects of
asymmetric money supply shocks are significant in Belgium, Finland, Italy, France and
Spain. Since the mid-80s, these countries sucessfully made use of the monetary policy
instrument within the restrictions of the ERM. In all other countries, output ratio effects
of autonomous monetary policy were small. Another unexpected implication is that with
18 See Gros (1996) for a discussion of the experience of Italy, United Kingdom and Spain.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 10
regard to monetary policy, monetary union will not deprive countries like Sweden and
the United Kingdom of an important stabilisation tool.
4 Conclusion
The costs of monetary union are considered by asking whether autonomous monetary
policy was an important stabilisation device in the past. We approach this question by
looking at the bilateral relationships between individual countries and Germany. The
countries under consideration are Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium (core countries)
as well as Sweden, Finland, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Spain (periphery
countries). Contrary to the the findings of previous literature, we found short- and me-
dium term output effects of monetary policy innovations relative to Germany being
significant in all countries except the core countries Austria and the Netherlands and
except the periphery countries Sweden and United Kingdom. In those countries,
autonomous monetary policy feeds directly into relative prices. On the other hand, in
Finland, Italy, France and Spain, autonomous monetary policy seems to have been an
important shock absorber, even so in Belgium. However, the effects are small compared
to the output ratio effects of asymmetric real supply shocks. Anyway, those countries
will have to bear some costs from giving up an autonomous monetary policy.
This general result has to be qualified in four respects: Firstly, since in our model we
assumed asymmetric demand shocks having no long-run impact on relative output, we
exclude possible long lasting output effects of monetary policy. One might for example
also argue that monetary policy can be useful to avoid a temporary shock (e.g. due to a
cyclical downturn) affecting output and employment permanently if hysteresis in these
variables is considered. However, the empirical relevance of such effects is unclear.
Theoretically, such effects are accounted for in endogenous growth models (Zagler,
1998).
Secondly, also in case of a permanent demand shock (e.g. due to the loss of one trading
partner), exchange rate policy could be useful in a transitory phase to respond quickly to
the shock (since for instance the acquisition of new markets needs time). If nominal
wages are fixed for a certain time period, the exchange rate instrument could be used
flexibly without delay whereas wage contracts can only be modified within a certain
period. Especially if money illusion exists, i.e. if unions do not respond to exchange rate
induced price increases in demanding higher nominal wages, a devaluation might be an
appropriate instrument.
The third remark is closely related to the second: In the history of the countries under
consideration, there are well-known episodes of devaluations, where some of them are
considered successful. The latest examples are the experiences of Italy, the United
Kingdom and Spain following the EMS crisis of September 1992. In the period after the
nominal depreciation in all three countries, domestic inflation did not offset a real de-
preciation (Gros, 1996). The time-inconsistency literature, however, expresses doubts
whether these kinds of operations can be successfully repeated at any time. Institutional
reforms in these countries such as a higher degree of independence of the central banks,
fiscal consolidation measures and the institutional change of the wage bargaining proc-
ess (as in Italy) may have contributed to the moderation of a price level increase. Our
results based on the empirical evaluation of historical data confirm that there have been
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monetary policy. But it is by no means clear whether these episodes can be repeated
successfully at any time.
Fourthly, the costs of surrendering autonomous monetary policy have to be weighted
against the benefits of disappearance of asymmetric financial market and money shocks
in EMU. The more open an economy with own money, the greater will be the transmis-
sion of asymmetric nominal shocks to the real economy. So even if there are costs asso-
ciated with the surrender of monetary policy, a common currency may be preferable, if
asymmetric nominal shocks such as speculative attacks and currency substitution, that
may cause macroeconomic imbalances, dominate over asymmetric real shocks.
We also analysed whether there would be any costs associated with the application of
the Pact for Stability and Growth decreasing a country's ability to counteract nationally
differentiated shocks, while providing no substitute at the centre. As we found relative
real government demand innovations to have initial output ratio effects in most of the
countries, some autonomy in fiscal policy could cushion adverse effects of a common
monetary policy. These effects have been shown to be quite pronounced in Sweden,
Finland and the United Kongdom and of some significance in Belgium and France.
Of course, as the analysis is retrospective, we cannot definitely conclude what the costs
of EMU might be. However, there is evidence that there will be situations where a
country might be better off with its own currency, at least over some limited time hori-
zon. So there is a need of insurance against the effects of asymmetric real shocks in
EMU.
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6 Appendix A: Structural Vector Autoregression
6.1 Model Estimation and Identification
Assume that a vector x D of variables follows a covariance stationary process with a
moving average representation of the form
(16) . ) L ( t t u C x = D
In our case [] ¢ D - D D D D p p m g y ), ( , , = x , with y the log of real output ratios between the
country under investigation and Germany, g the log of the relative real fiscal variable,
m-p the log of the relative real money variable and p the log of relative prices. C(L) is a
lag polynomial where the C's are coefficient matrices at the respective lags of the seri-
ally uncorrelated errors u with  = ) ' E( u u . We normalise the first coefficient matrix of
the polynomial, C0, to be the identity matrix I.
A normalised moving average representation of the process can be given as
(17) , ) L ( t t e E x = D
with I e e = ) ' E( (by assumption) and the shocks uncorrelated across time and across
variables.
Only the u's, but not the e's can be estimated directly from a VAR. Since the u's have
nonzero covariance terms, implying that the disturbances are correlated with each other,
the problem is to separate the u's into (orthogonal) uncorrelated shocks (e's) in order to
ensure independence between the shocks. As we have assumed C0=I and we assume a
linear relation between C(L) and E(L) we can write
(18) uE e tt = 0 .
In order to recover e's from the u's, the E0-matrix has to be derived. Thereby we assume
that the estimated shocks are linear combinations of the underlying structural distur-
bances.
Now the problem is to find E0 imposingkk ´ restrictions, where k is the number of vari-
ables in the model and thus kk ´ is the dimension of E0.
From ee'=I and uu'=    we have with (18)
(19) S= ¢ EE 00 .




tions, for the rest of
kk () -1
2
we impose triangular long-term neutrality conditions on
certain errors driving the respective variables as derived from the theoretical model. If
we evaluate the polynomial matrices at L=1, where a matrix E(1)=E0+E1+E2+E3..., the
sum of these responses to infinity is the long-run multiplier for each variable, thus we
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where x x x - = D
¥ ® t tlim
* and the zeros in E(1) indicate that in the long-run equilibrium (as
derived in equations (12) to (15)) the respective shocks have no long-run effects on the
indicated variables.
As ) 1 ( E is assumed to be lower triangular, we can use this fact to recover 0 E in the fol-
lowing way. Equating (16)a n d(17) at their long-run values we have
(21) Cu Ee () () . 11 tt =
With ee'=I and uu'=    the long run matrix E(1) is the result of a Choleski decomposi-
tion,
(22) CC E E () () () (). 11 1 1 S ¢ = ¢
From the estimated values for C(L), accumulated for C(1), the variance-covariance ma-
trix     and the Choleski factor E(1) we can then recover E0 as
(23) ). 1 ( ) 1 (
1
0 E C E
- =
The matrix 0 E can then be used in t t e E u 0 = to compute the impact of structural shocks
on the entries in xt (orthogonal impulse responses).
19 From these responses variance
decompositions, which allocate each variable´s forecast error variance to the individual
shocks, can be computed.
For the following analysis we estimate a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model of the
form
20
(24) Ax u () L D tt =
and compute the long-run entries of A(1). Inverting yields A(1)
-1=C(1) from the long-
run representation of (16). Consequently we get E0 from (22)a n d(23), which we use to
compute the respective impulse responses and the forecast error variance decomposi-
tions of the structural shocks given in (17). Figures 1,3,5... in the appendix B show the
results of such calculations.
21
19 As an increase of real relative balances (m-p) due to a structural shock would have to be interpreted as a negative
relative velocity shock (cf. equ. (6)), in implementing the identification procedure we multiply all elements of the
third column of E0 by -1 to get a positive interpretation of the private demand or velocity shock.
20 For an extensive description of the procedures involved in VAR analyses cf., e.g., Hamilton (1994), pp.291-350, or
Judge et al. (1988), pp.720-775.
21 For impulse responses only their accumulated paths are displayed. This is more useful in interpreting effects on the
levels of variables (and not differences, as used for estimation).SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 16
6.2 Simulations Using Structural Shocks
Having recovered the structural shocks et from the estimated errors ut through the re-
lation eE u tt =
-
0
1 , alternative forecast simulations can be computed by dropping certain









t e , e , 0 , e = e for the simulations "absent government demand (fiscal pol-
icy)" and []
¢








t e for the simulations "absent monetary policy", where the
errors
x
t u ( m d f s x , , , = ) to be used for the forecasts with the estimated VAR models
will be recovered through
x x
t t e E u 0 = .
As the originally estimated variables are differences, we also perform accumulations
(including a mean that had been subtracted before estimation) in order to see how the
simulated levels of the variables would evolve under the different assumptions. Figures
2,4,6... of appendix B show the results of the simulations for relative GDP and prices
absent the respective structural shock for the variables' levels as deviations of the actual
from the simulated paths.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 17
7 Appendix B: Graphs
Figure 1: Austria - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1995:04)
of GDP AT/DE  to Supply







of GDP AT/DE  to Gvt.Demd.







of GDP AT/DE  to Prv.Demd.







of GDP AT/DE  to Mon.Pol.







Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1998.
Figure 2: Austria - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1995:04 )





































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 18
Figure 3: The Netherlands - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP NL/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 4: The Netherlands - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )






































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 19
Figure 5: Belgium - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP BE/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 6: Belgium - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )











































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 20
Figure 7: Sweden - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP SE/DE  to Supply
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of GDP SE/DE  to Mon.Pol.











Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 8: Sweden - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )













































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 21
Figure 9: Finland - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP FI/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 10: Finland - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )











































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 22
Figure 11: Italy - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP IT/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 12: Italy - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )












































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 23
Figure 13: United Kingdom - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP UK/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 14: United Kingdom - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )






































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 24
Figure 15: France - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP FR/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 16: France - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )







































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 25
Figure 17: Spain - Accumulated Impulse Response Functions
(VAR estim. with 3 lags, 1971:04 - 1996:04)
of GDP ES/DE  to Supply
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Note: The solid lines indicate the estimated and accumulated response to the respective first period structural unit shock, dashed
lines above and below are the upper and lower two standard deviation bounds computed from a simulation as described in Schu-
berth/Wehinger 1988.
Figure 18: Spain - Deviations of Actual from Simulated Variables (Levels)
( 1971:04 - 1996:04 )











































Note: Deviations are defined as the difference between the indicated actual variable and the respective simulated variable, where
simulations were performed setting the indicated respective structural shock path to zero as described in appendix A. As also de-
scribed in the text, for all countries analysed variables are defined relative to the respective German ones.SCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 26
Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Austria
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 78% 65% 63% 5% 11% 11% 4% 21% 21% 27% 24% 24%
of Govt.Dem. 10% 11% 11% 89% 77% 75% 3% 11% 11% 5% 7% 8%
of Prv.Dem. 4% 16% 16% 3% 7% 7% 80% 57% 55% 4% 7% 8%
of Mon.Pol. 8% 9% 9% 4% 6% 7% 13% 12% 13% 65% 62% 60%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The Netherlands
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 73% 69% 69% 8% 16% 20% 9% 27% 29% 12% 39% 41%
of Govt.Dem. 12% 11% 11% 67% 63% 60% 8% 12% 12% 9% 13% 13%
of Prv.Dem. 5% 8% 7% 16% 12% 11% 73% 53% 51% 6% 9% 9%
of Mon.Pol. 10% 13% 12% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 73% 39% 37%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Belgium
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 63% 54% 53% 7% 14% 14% 5% 9% 9% 13% 13% 14%
of Govt.Dem. 15% 21% 21% 42% 50% 49% 10% 16% 17% 40% 30% 31%
of Prv.Dem. 4% 7% 7% 10% 8% 8% 78% 67% 65% 17% 11% 11%
of Mon.Pol. 19% 18% 18% 41% 28% 28% 7% 8% 9% 30% 45% 44%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Sweden
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 62% 62% 61% 28% 31% 31% 8% 17% 17% 8% 23% 24%
of Govt.Dem. 21% 20% 22% 51% 57% 57% 12% 19% 21% 15% 39% 41%
of Prv.Dem. 14% 13% 12% 17% 8% 8% 71% 55% 53% 17% 11% 10%
of Mon.Pol. 3% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 9% 9% 9% 61% 28% 25%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Finland
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 35% 46% 42% 17% 16% 19% 4% 12% 13% 45% 30% 31%
of Govt.Dem. 55% 42% 44% 22% 53% 51% 4% 10% 11% 23% 41% 41%
of Prv.Dem. 4% 4% 4% 13% 7% 7% 87% 72% 70% 9% 7% 7%
of Mon.Pol. 6% 9% 10% 49% 24% 23% 4% 7% 7% 22% 22% 21%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Italy
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 77% 58% 57% 7% 13% 15% 12% 17% 18% 12% 23% 24%
of Govt.Dem. 11% 13% 13% 40% 41% 41% 21% 16% 17% 7% 16% 17%
of Prv.Dem. 5% 12% 13% 8% 14% 13% 45% 52% 50% 49% 20% 20%
of Mon.Pol. 8% 17% 17% 44% 32% 31% 22% 15% 16% 32% 40% 39%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
in rel.GDP IT/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. IT/DE in rel.M3 IT/DE in rel.CPI IT/DE
in rel.GDP FI/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. FI/DE in rel.M3 FI/DE in rel.CPI FI/DE
in rel.GDP SE/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. SE/DE in rel.M3 SE/DE in rel.CPI SE/DE
in rel.GDP BE/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. BE/DE in rel.M3 BE/DE in rel.CPI BE/DE
in rel.GDP NL/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. NL/DE in rel.M3 NL/DE in rel.CPI NL/DE
in rel.GDP AT/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. AT/DE in rel.M3 AT/DE in rel.CPI AT/DE
United Kingdom
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 55% 59% 58% 8% 21% 22% 7% 25% 26% 38% 40% 40%
of Govt.Dem. 31% 28% 28% 64% 63% 62% 10% 18% 20% 20% 44% 44%
of Prv.Dem. 5% 8% 8% 4% 4% 5% 80% 54% 52% 5% 5% 6%
of Mon.Pol. 8% 6% 6% 23% 12% 11% 3% 2% 3% 37% 11% 10%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
France
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 50% 47% 47% 10% 17% 20% 6% 9% 10% 34% 26% 27%
of Govt.Dem. 35% 33% 33% 41% 52% 53% 6% 8% 9% 46% 47% 48%
of Prv.Dem. 6% 10% 10% 8% 7% 7% 84% 74% 71% 3% 6% 6%
of Mon.Pol. 9% 10% 10% 41% 23% 20% 5% 9% 10% 17% 21% 19%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Spain
Periods 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
of Supply 55% 54% 57% 12% 16% 17% 19% 26% 30% 34% 46% 49%
of Govt.Dem. 13% 13% 12% 73% 71% 70% 6% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%
of Prv.Dem. 20% 18% 17% 6% 6% 6% 57% 44% 41% 26% 17% 16%
of Mon.Pol. 11% 15% 15% 8% 7% 7% 18% 21% 20% 31% 29% 26%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
in rel.GDP ES/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. ES/DE in rel.M3 ES/DE in rel.CPI ES/DE
in rel.GDP FR/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. FR/DE in rel.M3 FR/DE in rel.CPI FR/DE
in rel.GDP UK/DE in rel.Gvt.Cons. UK/DE in rel.M3 UK/DE in rel.CPI UK/DESCHUBERTH/WEHINGER: Costs of European Monetary Union 27